Summary
Blackpoint Cyber's Adversary Pursuit Group (APG) has identified the previously unnamed RAT distributed through the ROMULUS ClickFix delivery platform as CNCMachineRMS, a 1.14 MB x64 remote access trojan with no static imports, stack-built strings, and a custom scripting engine [1][6]. APG linked the payload to LevelBlue SpiderLabs' August 2026 research on CNCMachineRMS by matching family-specific identifiers and runtime string construction, including the path CNCMachineRMS\tasks and the file task_payload.bin [1][6]. ROMULUS operates as a multi-payload delivery service, distributing both CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader (also tracked as Satacom downloader, CurlyGate, and RobotDropper) through separate infection chains that share ClickFix lures and signed-binary sideloading techniques [1][2].
Forescout Research (Vedere Labs) first publicly documented ROMULUS on October 20, 2026, identifying six IP addresses hosting the platform's infrastructure [3][10]. Blackpoint's November 2026 report extends that work by recovering the final RAT payload from a trojanized Stardock installer and confirming that the same malware family appeared in LevelBlue's independent BabaDeda loader chain analysis [1]. Siemens has separately confirmed that attackers exploited a DLL search-order vulnerability (CVE-2026-110936, CVSS v4 8.4) in Siemens Software Center as part of the same broader ClickFix campaign, linking the activity to ROMULUS [4]. Huntress responded to at least 40 incidents tied to these chains [4].
Background: ROMULUS as a Delivery Service
ROMULUS functions as a ClickFix delivery platform. Forescout characterized it as potentially "a privately operated panel, a commercial cybercriminal delivery service, an affiliate framework, or software that has been copied between operators" [3][10]. No operator has claimed the platform. ROMULUS shares no overlaps with RomulusLoader, a separate malware family associated with Silver Fox (TA4922), a China-aligned threat actor that uses tax-related lures to distribute ValleyRAT, DcRAT, and Venom RAT [3][10].
Forescout identified six IP addresses running ROMULUS: 96.62.224[.]81, 86.109.75[.]7, 151.240.151[.]223, 23.94.145[.]224, 93.152.224[.]118, and 2.27.248[.]127 [3][10]. The address 96.62.224[.]81 hosted a ClickFix script and an MSI installer tied to a campaign that used malicious ChatGPT Custom GPTs to redirect victims to fake URLs serving ClickFix lures [2][10]. Forescout later found the same malware being delivered via 86.109.75[.]7, which hosted a panel codenamed ROMULUS [10].
Blackpoint's analysis added several more infrastructure nodes, including 93.152.213[.]151 as an observed C2 server, plus 167.76.44[.]160 and 167.148.201[.]224, both of which served ClipboardFusion.msi payloads, and 86.107.124[.]7 and 23.94.252[.]153 as additional ROMULUS servers [1]. Two domains, cloubflare[.]top and cloubflare[.]net, were also identified as ROMULUS C2 infrastructure [1].
Background: ClickFix as the Dominant Initial Access Technique
ClickFix is a social engineering method in which a fake verification page, typically impersonating a CAPTCHA check or browser error, copies a malicious command to the victim's clipboard and instructs the user to open the Windows Run dialog, paste the command, and press Enter [8]. No exploit is required. The user performs the execution.
ESET measured a 517% increase in ClickFix activity from late 2024 into the first half of 2025, and a further 108% rise between the second half of 2025 and the first half of 2026 [8]. Microsoft's 2025 Digital Defense Report attributed 47% of initial-access cases handled by its Defender Experts team to ClickFix, placing it ahead of conventional phishing [8][9]. MITRE assigned ClickFix its own sub-technique: T1204.004, User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste [8][9].
State-sponsored groups have adopted the technique. CTM360's global threat report documented ClickFix's progression from a novelty in late 2023 to a subscription product with on-chain infrastructure and a state-sponsored user base [8].
ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS Infection Chain: Stardock DLL Sideloading
The primary CNCMachineRMS delivery chain documented by Blackpoint begins with a ClickFix lure that executes a PowerShell command invoking msiexec.exe to install a malicious MSI package [1][2]. One analyzed payload was IconEdit2Turb.msi, a malicious installer distributed through ROMULUS ClickFix activity [1][2]. Additional MSI installers observed in the campaign include AllMyBasic.msi and ISOSimple.msi [1].
The installer masquerades as the Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool. Rather than modifying the signed executable DeElevate64.exe, the attackers altered the companion library DeElevator64.dll to introduce a dependency on a malicious DLL named I++u.dll, which is included in the installation directory [1]. When DeElevate64.exe starts, Windows loads the modified companion DLL and its additional dependency, executing malicious code within the context of the legitimate Stardock process [1].
I++u.dll decodes and runs embedded shellcode responsible for launching CNCMachineRMS [2]. The sideloading chain also involves senddmp.resources.dll, which allocates shellcode, and res.dll as a sideloaded DLL [1]. Build.dat has been identified as a co-located artifact in this chain [5].
This sideloading vector is not new. A HijackLibs pull request merged on October 1, 2026, documented the DeElevate64.exe / deelevator64.dll sideloading entry, noting that two unrelated intrusion sets, 20 months apart, have abused the same signed host [5]. Unit 42 reported on January 16, 2025, during their Ivanti CVE-2025-0282/CVE-2025-0283 threat brief, that attackers used DeElevate64.exe to sideload a malicious deelevator64.dll, creating a scheduled task named /mail to run the executable [5]. The malicious DLL in that earlier campaign loaded temp.log and had SHA256 a6b24fcef2e018c9ef634aa21e26a74ff94ea508a8b132fad38d48f5ab10fcd3 [5].
Persistence in the ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS chain uses the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run [1].
CNCMachineRMS: BabaDeda Loader Chain (LevelBlue SpiderLabs)
Blackpoint's attribution of the ROMULUS RAT to CNCMachineRMS rests on comparison with LevelBlue SpiderLabs' August 2026 research, which documented the same malware family at the end of a separate BabaDeda loader chain [1][6]. In that chain, infection starts with a ClickFix lure that launches the legitimately signed IBM SPSS IDE executable WinWrapIDE.exe [6][7]. The executable's scripting engine is abused to load a malicious DLL. Four decoy DLLs load through ordinary Windows import resolution, and the final stage smuggles shellcode into execution via EnumTimeFormatsEx, a benign date-formatting API repurposed as a trampoline [6].
The resulting implant is a 1.14 MB x64 remote access trojan with no import table [6]. Every string is built on the stack at runtime. Its configuration and C2 traffic travel in the same custom binary container format, and the implant is driven by a custom scripting language written by its author [6].
CNCMachineRMS Capabilities
LevelBlue SpiderLabs documented the following capabilities [6][7]:
- Interactive shell
- File manager
- Screen capture
- Local account backdoor
- Seven persistence mechanisms
- Twenty typed commands for pulling down and running additional payloads
- APIs resolved by hash at runtime (no static imports)
Persistence in the BabaDeda chain uses a Run key or scheduled task named IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE [6]. Task payload artifacts are stored at %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\*\task_payload.bin [6][7].
C2 communication uses DNS over HTTPS to bypass internal DNS monitoring, with the implant beaconing every 600 seconds to notepadreleased[.]com or 85.158.110[.]78 over TCP/443 [7]. A state database file at %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin contains the hostname, port, and two flags, padded with random data between 512 KiB and 16 MiB, with the hash changing roughly every 200 seconds [7]. The configuration file HelperStandardizationApplication.bin carries both a DSL orchestration script and the 1.14 MB embedded CNCMachineRMS payload under two obfuscation layers [7].
Blackpoint confirmed the connection between the ROMULUS Stardock chain and the BabaDeda chain by matching the RAT's runtime string construction, including CNCMachineRMS\tasks and task_payload.bin, with the task staging structure documented by LevelBlue SpiderLabs [1].
Siemens Software Center Exploitation
Siemens disclosed on October 15, 2026, that attackers exploited CVE-2026-110936 in Siemens Software Center as part of this campaign [4]. The vulnerability exists because the program doesn't properly restrict the locations it searches for DLL files. Siemens assigned a CVSS v4 score of 8.4 [4]. Version 4.0.9.8 resolves the issue, and users with existing installations receive the fix automatically on next launch [4].
The attackers paired a legitimate copy of the Siemens program, carrying a valid digital signature, with malicious DLL files they supplied [4]. Siemens stated that version 3.5.8.7, the newest release at the time, did not validate helper files before loading them [4]. Siemens confirmed that no Siemens system, product, or update channel was breached and that the malicious package was not spread through Siemens' distribution channels [4].
Siemens linked this activity to ROMULUS [4]. Forescout had observed the ROMULUS platform delivering LegionLoader malware as well as a trojanized installer that used a legitimate Stardock application for DLL sideloading [4]. Siemens Software Center is not mentioned in the Huntress or Forescout reports, but overlapping infrastructure and the similar sideloading approach suggest the Siemens program was added to the same toolkit [4].
LegionLoader Distribution Through ROMULUS
ROMULUS distributes LegionLoader through a separate infection chain from CNCMachineRMS [1][3][10]. A ClickFix-triggered PowerShell script selects the payload: either a trojanized MSI installer carrying a malware loader, or an encrypted archive containing Legion Loader [3]. The loader communicates with a remote server to fetch and run additional payloads [3]. Blackpoint confirmed that ROMULUS retains ClickFix and signed binary sideloading techniques across both the CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader chains [1].
ClickFix Attack Chain Maturation
Huntress, which responded to at least 40 incidents linked to ROMULUS-associated activity [4], revealed that ClickFix has broadened beyond simple script and loader delivery into attack chains establishing persistence, lateral movement, reconnaissance, and credential theft [2]. Some chains use steganography, with executables reconstructed from data hidden in PNG files [2]. Blackpoint noted that "threat actors are using increasingly elaborate delivery methods, including browser-cache-seeded chains and executables reconstructed from data hidden in PNG files" [2].
Researcher Bert-Jan Pals analyzed roughly 3,000 payloads from live ClickFix campaigns and found that backend servers operate as an on-demand service, returning freshly scrambled commands each time, wrapped in rotating combinations of Base64, AES, TripleDES, Rijndael, and Deflate obfuscation [9].
ChatGPT Custom GPTs have been used as a pathway to redirect users to malicious sites that deliver the RAT payload through the same ClickFix-plus-sideloading method [1][2].
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value | Context | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| IP | 93.152.213[.]151 |
ROMULUS C2 server | [1] |
| IP | 96.62.224[.]81 |
ROMULUS infrastructure, hosted ClickFix script and MSI | [3][10] |
| IP | 86.109.75[.]7 |
ROMULUS infrastructure, hosted ROMULUS panel | [3][10] |
| IP | 151.240.151[.]223 |
ROMULUS infrastructure | [3][10] |
| IP | 23.94.145[.]224 |
ROMULUS infrastructure | [3][10] |
| IP | 93.152.224[.]118 |
ROMULUS infrastructure | [3][10] |
| IP | 2.27.248[.]127 |
ROMULUS infrastructure, distribution server | [3][10] |
| IP | 167.76.44[.]160 |
ROMULUS C2, served ClipboardFusion.msi | [1] |
| IP | 167.148.201[.]224 |
ROMULUS C2, served ClipboardFusion.msi | [1] |
| IP | 86.107.124[.]7 |
ROMULUS C2 server | [1] |
| IP | 23.94.252[.]153 |
ROMULUS C2 server | [1] |
| IP | 85.158.110[.]78 |
CNCMachineRMS C2 (BabaDeda chain) | [7] |
| Domain | cloubflare[.]top |
ROMULUS C2 | [1] |
| Domain | cloubflare[.]net |
ROMULUS C2 | [1] |
| Domain | notepadreleased[.]com |
CNCMachineRMS C2 (DNS-over-HTTPS beaconing) | [7] |
| Domain | orders-amazon.com.advancedfences[.]com |
Spoofed Amazon login domain, ROMULUS ClickFix | [2] |
| Domain | veriffication-redirect[.]com |
Typosquatted ClickFix lure domain | [2] |
| Domain | login.microsoftofice[.]cz |
ClickFix phishing domain spoofing Microsoft Office | [2] |
| Domain | updates.howclens[.]com |
ClickFix domain spoofing UK retailer Howdens | [2] |
| Filename | IconEdit2Turb.msi |
Malicious MSI, ROMULUS Stardock chain | [1][2] |
| Filename | AllMyBasic.msi |
Malicious MSI, ROMULUS campaign | [1] |
| Filename | ISOSimple.msi |
Malicious MSI, ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS chain | [1] |
| Filename | DeElevate64.exe |
Legitimate Stardock signed binary abused for sideloading | [1][5] |
| Filename | DeElevator64.dll |
Patched companion DLL introducing malicious dependency | [1][5] |
| Filename | I++u.dll |
Malicious DLL, decodes shellcode for CNCMachineRMS | [1][5] |
| Filename | senddmp.resources.dll |
Shellcode allocation DLL in ROMULUS chain | [1][5] |
| Filename | res.dll |
Sideloaded DLL in ROMULUS chain | [1] |
| Filename | Build.dat |
Co-located artifact in Stardock sideloading chain | [5] |
| Filename | WinWrapIDE.exe |
Legitimate IBM SPSS IDE binary abused for sideloading | [1][6] |
| Filename | HelperStandardizationApplication.bin |
Config file carrying CNCMachineRMS payload | [7] |
| Filename | model.dat |
Shellcode file in CNCMachineRMS sideloading chain | [7] |
| Filepath | %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\*\task_payload.bin |
Task payload staging path | [6][7] |
| Filepath | %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin |
CNCMachineRMS state database | [7] |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique ID | Name | Context |
|---|---|---|
| T1204.004 | User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste | ClickFix lures instruct users to paste and execute clipboard content via Win+R [8][9] |
| T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading | Stardock DeElevate64.exe loads modified DeElevator64.dll and malicious I++u.dll; IBM SPSS WinWrapIDE.exe loads attacker-supplied DLLs; Siemens Software Center loads unsigned DLLs from its directory [1][4][6] |
| T1106 | Native API | Shellcode execution via EnumTimeFormatsEx callback abuse in BabaDeda chain [6] |
| T1136.001 | Create Account: Local Account | CNCMachineRMS provides local account backdoor capability [6] |
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | Local account backdoor maintained by CNCMachineRMS [6] |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task | Persistence via scheduled task named "IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE" (BabaDeda chain) or "/mail" (earlier Ivanti-related campaign) [5][6] |
| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | C2 over TCP/443 with DNS-over-HTTPS for domain resolution [7] |
| T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys | HKCU Run key persistence in ROMULUS Stardock chain [1] |
Process Chain Monitoring
The ClickFix-to-ROMULUS kill chain produces a distinctive process tree. The user pastes a command into the Run dialog, which spawns powershell.exe from explorer.exe. PowerShell then calls msiexec.exe to install the malicious MSI [1][2]. Dependable detection signals are explorer.exe or WindowsTerminal.exe launching powershell.exe, cmd.exe, or msiexec.exe with subsequent network connections [9].
Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) is the primary telemetry source. Alert on msiexec.exe with command-line arguments referencing URLs or non-standard MSI filenames like IconEdit2Turb.msi, AllMyBasic.msi, ISOSimple.msi, or ClipboardFusion.msi [1].
DLL Sideloading Detection
Sysmon Event ID 7 (image loaded) is critical for detecting the sideloading step. Hunt for DeElevate64.exe loading I++u.dll, senddmp.resources.dll, or res.dll from non-standard directories [1][5]. Huntress identified checksum mismatch in DeElevator64.dll, or co-located I++u.dll, senddmp.resources.dll, res.dll, and Build.dat, as hunting artifacts [5].
For the BabaDeda chain, monitor for WinWrapIDE.exe execution outside of a legitimate IBM SPSS installation directory. Detection relies on Sysmon Event ID 1 and Event ID 7 with focus on execution path and parent process context, since WinWrapIDE.exe may legitimately exist on systems with IBM SPSS installed [7].
For Siemens Software Center exploitation, monitor for unsigned DLLs loaded by the Siemens executable from its own directory. Version 4.0.9.8 patches this behavior [4].
Sigma Rule: MSIExec Spawned from PowerShell via Explorer (ClickFix Pattern)
title: ClickFix MSIExec Execution via PowerShell from Explorer
id: 7a3c9d1e-5b2f-4e8a-9c1d-3f7e2b8a4d6c
status: experimental
author: RedSheepSec
date: 2026/11/20
description: Detects msiexec.exe spawned by powershell.exe with explorer.exe as grandparent, consistent with ClickFix clipboard-paste execution chains.
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_grandparent:
GrandParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software deployment scripts launched interactively
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
Sigma Rule: Stardock DeElevate64 DLL Sideloading
title: Stardock DeElevate64 DLL Sideloading Indicators
id: 2f8b4c3a-1d9e-4a7f-b5c2-6e0d3f9a1b8c
status: experimental
author: RedSheepSec
date: 2026/11/20
description: Detects DeElevate64.exe loading known malicious DLLs associated with ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS delivery.
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_host:
Image|endswith: '\DeElevate64.exe'
selection_dll:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\I++u.dll'
- '\senddmp.resources.dll'
- '\res.dll'
condition: selection_host and selection_dll
falsepositives:
- None expected
level: critical
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1574.002
Network Indicators
Monitor DNS queries for notepadreleased[.]com, cloubflare[.]top, and cloubflare[.]net [1][7]. CNCMachineRMS uses DNS over HTTPS to resolve its C2 domain, which means standard internal DNS monitoring won't capture the resolution [7]. TLS inspection or endpoint DNS logging (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 22) is required to detect DoH-based C2 resolution.
Monitor outbound connections to TCP/443 on 85.158.110[.]78 and the ROMULUS infrastructure IPs listed in the IOC table above [7][1][3].
Filesystem Artifacts
Search for the following paths:
%TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\*\task_payload.bin[6][7]%LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin[7]HelperStandardizationApplication.binin user-writable directories [7]Build.datco-located withDeElevate64.exein non-standard directories [5]
Analysis
ROMULUS fits the operational profile of a delivery-as-a-service platform. Blackpoint's identification of separate but technically consistent infection chains distributing CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader, while sharing ClickFix lures, signed-binary sideloading, and overlapping infrastructure, is consistent with how commodity malware-as-a-service operations structure their offerings [1]. The platform abstracts payload delivery from the actors using it, allowing different downstream operators to select payloads while benefiting from shared evasion techniques.
The use of multiple legitimately signed binaries for sideloading (Stardock DeElevate64.exe, IBM SPSS WinWrapIDE.exe, Siemens Software Center) reflects systematic reconnaissance of DLL search-order weaknesses in popular software. Huntress believes signed programs from other vendors are probably being misused as well [4]. The HijackLibs entry for DeElevate64.exe documents two unrelated intrusion sets, 20 months apart, abusing the same host binary [5], which demonstrates how sideloading vectors persist across campaigns once discovered.
CNCMachineRMS itself is designed for stealth and flexibility. The absence of static imports, stack-built strings, DNS-over-HTTPS C2 resolution, and a state database file padded with random data between 512 KiB and 16 MiB that changes hash every 200 seconds all complicate both static and behavioral detection [6][7]. The implant's custom scripting language and twenty typed commands for staging additional payloads give operators significant post-compromise flexibility.
The broader ClickFix ecosystem continues to mature. Backend servers now operate as API-driven on-demand services, returning uniquely obfuscated payloads per request [9]. Attack chains have expanded beyond simple loader delivery into persistence, lateral movement, and credential theft, with some campaigns using steganography to reconstruct executables from data hidden in PNG files [2]. ESET's measurement of a further 108% rise in ClickFix activity between the second half of 2025 and the first half of 2026 indicates continued growth in adoption [8].
Red Sheep Assessment
Assessment (Moderate Confidence): ROMULUS is operating as a structured, multi-tenant delivery platform rather than a single-actor campaign. Three independent research organizations (Forescout, Blackpoint, and Huntress) have documented distinct aspects of its infrastructure, and Siemens has confirmed exploitation of its software within the same campaign context [1][3][4]. The separation of CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader into distinct infection chains that share infrastructure and delivery techniques, combined with the platform's panel-based architecture observed by Forescout [3][10], points to a service model where payload operators are distinct from the platform operator.
The systematic targeting of signed-binary sideloading vectors across multiple vendors (Stardock, IBM, Siemens) suggests an operator or development team actively cataloging DLL hijack opportunities and packaging them for downstream use. The pace of new sideloading targets being added, with Siemens Software Center appearing after the initial Stardock and IBM SPSS vectors were documented, is consistent with ongoing development rather than a static toolkit.
Blackpoint assesses with high confidence that delivery-service platforms like ROMULUS will continue to be developed and offered across the cybercriminal ecosystem as ClickFix-style techniques evolve [1]. The combination of ClickFix as the dominant initial-access technique (47% of Microsoft Defender Experts cases [8]) and the low technical barrier for end users to execute the payload creates a delivery model where the main bottleneck is lure quality and distribution reach, not exploit development.
An alternative interpretation is that ROMULUS is a single operator's internal tooling that happens to serve multiple payloads, rather than a commercial service. The absence of any operator claim and the lack of observed forum advertisements or affiliate recruitment (not reported in any source) leave this possibility open. However, the multi-payload architecture and panel infrastructure weigh against a purely private-use interpretation.
Confidence justification: Moderate confidence is assigned because while multiple independent sources corroborate the platform's existence, infrastructure, and payloads, the operational model (commercial service vs. private panel vs. affiliate framework) remains unconfirmed, and no attribution to a specific threat actor or group has been established in any source.
Defender's Checklist
- ▢[ ] Block or alert on the ROMULUS infrastructure IPs and domains listed in the IOC table. Add
notepadreleased[.]com,cloubflare[.]top,cloubflare[.]net, and all eleven IP addresses to network blocklists and SIEM watchlists.
- ▢[ ] Deploy the two Sigma rules above (ClickFix MSIExec pattern and Stardock DeElevate64 sideloading) in your SIEM or EDR. Tune the ClickFix rule to exclude known legitimate software deployment workflows.
- ▢[ ] Hunt for CNCMachineRMS filesystem artifacts:
%TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\*\task_payload.bin,%LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin,HelperStandardizationApplication.bin, andBuild.datco-located withDeElevate64.exein user-writable directories.
- ▢[ ] Verify Siemens Software Center installations are updated to version 4.0.9.8 or later (CVE-2026-110936). Audit for unsigned DLLs in Siemens Software Center's installation directory.
- ▢[ ] Implement endpoint DNS logging (Sysmon Event ID 22 or equivalent) to detect DNS-over-HTTPS resolution of C2 domains. Standard internal DNS monitoring does not capture DoH queries from CNCMachineRMS.
References
[1] https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/
[2] https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/romulus-clickfix-attacks-deliver-rat.html
[3] https://news.lavx.hu/article/hackers-use-romulus-clickfix-platform-to-deliver-legionloader-malware
[4] https://www.securityweek.com/siemens-software-center-vulnerability-exploited-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
[5] https://github.com/wietze/HijackLibs/pull/199
[6] https://www.levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/cncmachinerms-the-undocumented-rat-at-the-end-of-a-babadeda-chain
[7] https://cyfar.ca/posts/cncmachinerms-the-undocumented-rat-at-the-end-of-a-babadeda-chain
[8] https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/17000-urls-reveal-how-clickfix-turns.html
[9] https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/researcher-analyzes-3000-live-clickfix.html
[10] https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/romulus-clickfix-platform-tricks-users.html
Event Timeline
Timeline
Entity Relationships
Entity Graph (11 entities, 7 relationships)
Diamond Model
Diamond Model
Hunt Guide: ROMULUS ClickFix Delivery Platform Distributing CNCMachineRMS RAT via DLL Sideloading
Attribution: Rules adapted, ported, or quoted from a public source retain that source's author (e.g. SigmaHQ / Florian Roth, Elastic, Emerging Threats, Abuse.ch, or the cited vendor/researcher) and carry an attribution credit. Rules without a credit were authored in-house by RedSheepSec. If you reuse a rule, preserve its stated attribution.
Hypothesis: If the ROMULUS ClickFix delivery platform is active in our environment, we expect to observe ClickFix-initiated PowerShell execution spawning msiexec.exe, DLL sideloading via DeElevate64.exe or WinWrapIDE.exe loading unsigned DLLs, DNS-over-HTTPS beaconing to known C2 domains, CNCMachineRMS filesystem artifacts in %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA%, and outbound connections to documented ROMULUS infrastructure IPs in Sysmon, PowerShell, DNS, and network flow logs.
Intelligence Summary: ROMULUS is a multi-payload ClickFix delivery platform distributing CNCMachineRMS, a 1.14 MB x64 RAT with no static imports and a custom scripting engine, alongside LegionLoader through separate infection chains that share signed-binary DLL sideloading techniques. The platform exploits DLL search-order weaknesses in Stardock DeElevate64.exe, IBM SPSS WinWrapIDE.exe, and Siemens Software Center (CVE-2026-110936), with CNCMachineRMS using DNS-over-HTTPS C2 beaconing, registry Run key persistence, and task payload staging under %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks. No specific threat actor has been attributed to ROMULUS, and multiple independent research organizations (Forescout, Blackpoint, Huntress, Siemens) have documented its infrastructure; the operational model, whether commercial delivery service, private panel, or affiliate framework, remains unconfirmed.
Confidence: Moderate | Priority: High
Scope
- Networks: All Windows endpoints across enterprise and clinical networks, with emphasis on user workstations where ClickFix social engineering is most likely to succeed. Include network segments with outbound internet access, particularly those permitting HTTPS to arbitrary destinations.
- Timeframe: 60-day retrospective hunt window (September 20 to November 20, 2026), aligned with Forescout's initial public documentation of ROMULUS on October 20, 2026, and Siemens' CVE-2026-110936 disclosure on October 15, 2026. Extend to 90 days if DeElevate64.exe sideloading artifacts are found, given HijackLibs documentation of this vector being abused across 20-month timespans.
- Priority Systems: User workstations with internet browser access (ClickFix initial access vector targets end users). Systems with Stardock software, IBM SPSS, or Siemens Software Center installed. Administrative workstations and systems with elevated privileges. Systems showing recent msiexec.exe execution from user context.
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T1204.004: User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste (Execution) [P2]
ROMULUS ClickFix lures present fake CAPTCHA or browser-error pages that copy a malicious PowerShell command to the victim's clipboard, instructing the user to open the Windows Run dialog and paste the command. This spawns PowerShell from explorer.exe, which then calls msiexec.exe to install a trojanized MSI package. Microsoft attributed 47% of initial-access cases to this technique.
Splunk SPL:
index=sysmon EventCode=1 (Image="*\\msiexec.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe"
| eval is_msiexec=if(like(Image, "%msiexec.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval is_powershell=if(like(Image, "%powershell.exe") OR like(Image, "%pwsh.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval suspicious_msi=if(like(CommandLine, "%IconEdit2Turb%") OR like(CommandLine, "%AllMyBasic%") OR like(CommandLine, "%ISOSimple%") OR like(CommandLine, "%ClipboardFusion%") OR like(CommandLine, "%http%"), 1, 0)
| where is_powershell=1 OR (is_msiexec=1 AND suspicious_msi=1)
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, ProcessId
Elastic KQL:
(process.name:("msiexec.exe" OR "powershell.exe" OR "pwsh.exe") AND process.parent.name:"explorer.exe") OR (process.name:"msiexec.exe" AND process.command_line:(*IconEdit2Turb* OR *AllMyBasic* OR *ISOSimple* OR *ClipboardFusion* OR *http*))
Sigma Rule:
title: ClickFix MSIExec Execution via PowerShell from Explorer
id: 7a3c9d1e-5b2f-4e8a-9c1d-3f7e2b8a4d6c
status: experimental
author: RedSheepSec
date: 2026/11/20
description: Detects msiexec.exe spawned by powershell.exe with explorer.exe as grandparent, consistent with ClickFix clipboard-paste execution chains documented by Blackpoint and Huntress.
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_grandparent:
GrandParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software deployment scripts launched interactively via Run dialog
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
Tune out known IT deployment workflows that legitimately use explorer.exe -> powershell.exe -> msiexec.exe chains. The grandparent relationship may require Sysmon with process tree enrichment or EDR data that tracks grandparent processes. Some SIEM configurations may not natively support GrandParentImage; consider using join or transaction commands in Splunk to correlate parent chains.
T1574.002: Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (Defense Evasion) [P1]
ROMULUS uses three distinct signed-binary sideloading vectors: Stardock DeElevate64.exe loading a modified DeElevator64.dll and malicious I++u.dll; IBM SPSS WinWrapIDE.exe loading attacker-supplied DLLs; and Siemens Software Center (CVE-2026-110936) loading unsigned DLLs from its directory. The Stardock vector has been abused by at least two unrelated intrusion sets over 20 months. The modified companion DLL introduces a dependency on I++u.dll, which decodes and executes embedded shellcode to launch CNCMachineRMS.
Splunk SPL:
index=sysmon EventCode=7 (Image="*\\DeElevate64.exe" AND (ImageLoaded="*\\I++u.dll" OR ImageLoaded="*\\senddmp.resources.dll" OR ImageLoaded="*\\res.dll"))
OR (Image="*\\WinWrapIDE.exe" AND NOT ImageLoaded="*\\IBM*")
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, SignatureStatus
| sort - _time
Elastic KQL:
(process.name:"DeElevate64.exe" AND dll.name:("I++u.dll" OR "senddmp.resources.dll" OR "res.dll")) OR (process.name:"WinWrapIDE.exe" AND NOT dll.path:*IBM*)
Sigma Rule:
title: Stardock DeElevate64 DLL Sideloading Indicators
id: 2f8b4c3a-1d9e-4a7f-b5c2-6e0d3f9a1b8c
status: experimental
author: RedSheepSec
date: 2026/11/20
description: Detects DeElevate64.exe loading known malicious DLLs associated with ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS delivery via DLL sideloading.
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_host:
Image|endswith: '\DeElevate64.exe'
selection_dll:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\I++u.dll'
- '\senddmp.resources.dll'
- '\res.dll'
condition: selection_host and selection_dll
falsepositives:
- None expected
level: critical
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1574.002
DeElevate64.exe is a legitimate Stardock utility. The sideloading detection keys on specific malicious DLL names loaded alongside it. For WinWrapIDE.exe, filter out legitimate IBM SPSS installations. Monitor for Build.dat co-located with DeElevate64.exe in user-writable directories as an additional hunting artifact.
T1547.001: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys (Persistence) [P2]
The ROMULUS Stardock CNCMachineRMS infection chain persists via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The BabaDeda chain alternatively uses a Run key or a scheduled task named IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE.
Splunk SPL:
index=sysmon (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13) TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run*" (Details="*DeElevate64*" OR Details="*WinWrapIDE*" OR Details="*I++u*" OR Details="*Stardock*" OR Details="*SProject*" OR Details="*CNCMachine*")
| table _time, Computer, User, EventCode, TargetObject, Details, Image
Elastic KQL:
event.code:("12" OR "13") AND registry.path:*CurrentVersion\\Run* AND registry.data.strings:(*DeElevate64* OR *WinWrapIDE* OR *Stardock* OR *SProject*)
Sigma Rule:
title: ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS Registry Run Key Persistence
id: 3c9a7e2b-4d1f-5e8c-a0b3-7f6e1d2c8a4b
status: experimental
author: RedSheepSec
date: 2026/11/20
description: Detects registry Run key modifications referencing binaries or paths associated with ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS persistence, including DeElevate64, WinWrapIDE, and Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool.
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_key:
TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run'
selection_value:
Details|contains:
- 'DeElevate64'
- 'WinWrapIDE'
- 'Stardock'
- 'I++u'
condition: selection_key and selection_value
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Stardock software installations
level: high
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
If legitimate Stardock software is installed in the environment, correlate with known installation paths. CNCMachineRMS persistence in the BabaDeda chain may alternatively use a scheduled task named IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE.
T1053.005: Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (Persistence) [P2]
CNCMachineRMS uses scheduled tasks for persistence. The BabaDeda chain creates a task named IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE. An earlier Ivanti-related campaign using the same DeElevate64.exe sideloading vector created a task named /mail.
Splunk SPL:
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe" (CommandLine="*IBM SPSS WinWrap*" OR CommandLine="*/mail*" OR CommandLine="*DeElevate64*" OR CommandLine="*WinWrapIDE*")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine
| append [search index=winevent EventCode=4698 (TaskContent="*DeElevate64*" OR TaskContent="*WinWrapIDE*" OR TaskName="*IBM SPSS*" OR TaskName="*/mail*")
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, TaskContent]
Elastic KQL:
(process.name:"schtasks.exe" AND process.command_line:(*"IBM SPSS WinWrap"* OR *"/mail"* OR *DeElevate64* OR *WinWrapIDE*)) OR (event.code:"4698" AND winlog.event_data.TaskName:(*"IBM SPSS"* OR *"/mail"*))
The scheduled task name IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE may appear legitimate in environments with IBM SPSS installed. Correlate with process tree and DLL loading context.
T1071.001: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (Command and Control) [P1]
CNCMachineRMS C2 communication uses TCP/443 with DNS-over-HTTPS to bypass internal DNS monitoring. The implant beacons every 600 seconds to notepadreleased[.]com or 85.158.110[.]78. Standard DNS monitoring will not capture DoH resolution; endpoint DNS logging (Sysmon Event ID 22) or TLS inspection is required.
Splunk SPL:
index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("notepadreleased.com", "cloubflare.top", "cloubflare.net")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by Computer, User, Image, QueryName, QueryResults
| table Computer, User, Image, QueryName, QueryResults, count, first_seen, last_seen
Elastic KQL:
event.code:"22" AND dns.question.name:("notepadreleased.com" OR "cloubflare.top" OR "cloubflare.net")
Sigma Rule:
title: CNCMachineRMS C2 DNS Resolution
id: 4d8e1f3c-6a2b-5c9d-b7e0-8f1a3d4c2e5b
status: experimental
author: RedSheepSec
date: 2026/11/20
description: Detects DNS queries to known CNCMachineRMS and ROMULUS C2 domains including notepadreleased.com and typosquatted Cloudflare domains.
logsource:
category: dns_query
product: windows
detection:
selection:
QueryName:
- 'notepadreleased.com'
- 'cloubflare.top'
- 'cloubflare.net'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None expected
level: critical
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
CNCMachineRMS uses DNS-over-HTTPS, so standard internal DNS server logs (index=dns) will not capture these queries. Sysmon Event ID 22 (DNS query) on endpoints is the primary detection source. TLS inspection at the perimeter may reveal DoH queries to public resolvers. Also monitor for outbound connections to 85.158.110[.]78 on TCP/443.
T1106: Native API (Execution) [P2]
In the BabaDeda loader chain, CNCMachineRMS shellcode execution is achieved by abusing the EnumTimeFormatsEx Windows API callback as a trampoline. The implant resolves all APIs by hash at runtime with no static imports.
Splunk SPL:
index=sysmon EventCode=7 Image="*\\WinWrapIDE.exe"
| stats count by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed
| where Signed!="true"
| table Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, count
Elastic KQL:
event.code:"7" AND process.name:"WinWrapIDE.exe" AND NOT dll.code_signature.status:"trusted"
Direct detection of EnumTimeFormatsEx abuse is difficult without memory forensics or EDR callback monitoring. The best proxy is monitoring unsigned DLL loads by WinWrapIDE.exe outside legitimate IBM SPSS directories.
T1136.001: Create Account: Local Account (Persistence) [P2]
CNCMachineRMS includes a local account backdoor capability, allowing operators to create local accounts on compromised systems.
Splunk SPL:
index=winevent sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720
| where NOT match(TargetUserName, "(?i)(admin|service|setup|install)")
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, SubjectLogonId
Elastic KQL:
event.code:"4720" AND NOT winlog.event_data.TargetUserName:(*admin* OR *service* OR *setup*)
CNCMachineRMS local account creation may use standard net.exe or direct API calls. Correlate new account creation events with prior indicators of CNCMachineRMS presence such as DeElevate64.exe execution or known C2 connections.
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value | Context | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ip | 93.152.213.151 |
ROMULUS C2 server \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (1 reports, NL) |
| ip | 96.62.224.81 |
ROMULUS infrastructure; hosted ClickFix script and MSI installer \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 22% (6 reports, DE) |
| ip | 86.109.75.7 |
ROMULUS infrastructure; hosted ROMULUS panel \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 11% (3 reports, US) |
| ip | 151.240.151.223 |
ROMULUS infrastructure \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 15% (4 reports, DE) |
| ip | 23.94.145.224 |
ROMULUS infrastructure \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (1 reports, US) |
| ip | 93.152.224.118 |
ROMULUS infrastructure \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (0 reports, DE) |
| ip | 2.27.248.127 |
ROMULUS infrastructure; distribution server \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 7% (2 reports, DE) |
| ip | 167.76.44.160 |
ROMULUS C2; served ClipboardFusion.msi \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (0 reports, US) |
| ip | 167.148.201.224 |
ROMULUS C2; served ClipboardFusion.msi \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (0 reports, US) |
| ip | 86.107.124.7 |
ROMULUS C2 server \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (0 reports, BE) |
| ip | 23.94.252.153 |
ROMULUS C2 server \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (1 reports, US) |
| ip | 85.158.110.78 |
CNCMachineRMS C2 (BabaDeda chain); TCP/443 beaconing target \ | AbuseIPDB confidence 0% (0 reports, NL) |
| domain | cloubflare.top |
ROMULUS C2 domain; typosquatted Cloudflare \ | VirusTotal 15/92 malicious |
| domain | cloubflare.net |
ROMULUS C2 domain; typosquatted Cloudflare \ | VirusTotal 19/92 malicious |
| domain | notepadreleased.com |
CNCMachineRMS C2 domain; DNS-over-HTTPS beaconing every 600 seconds \ | VirusTotal 15/92 malicious |
| domain | orders-amazon.com.advancedfences.com |
Spoofed Amazon login domain used in ROMULUS ClickFix campaign \ | VirusTotal 1/92 malicious |
| domain | veriffication-redirect.com |
Typosquatted ClickFix lure domain \ | VirusTotal 9/92 malicious |
| domain | login.microsoftofice.cz |
ClickFix phishing domain spoofing Microsoft Office login \ | VirusTotal 4/92 malicious |
| domain | updates.howclens.com |
ClickFix domain spoofing UK retailer Howdens \ | VirusTotal 18/92 malicious |
| hash_sha256 | 0457414c4504b70115798eee9c8384a8bf9e793461ffb2e0661a6dcc6ed4809f |
Modified/sideloaded DeElevator64.dll \ | VirusTotal 40/73 malicious (trojan.loader/malgent) |
| hash_sha256 | f4d7c5321bb0d1bda439304a753bcf9b467b98ca53c7e9493b9c2c3451092e4a |
AllMyBasic.msi malicious ROMULUS installer \ | VirusTotal 21/73 malicious (trojan.dllhijack/shellcoderunner) |
| hash_sha256 | 6761aad48a3f987238994d92bca97e4b8550e0150607bd67b47b1b6366a371fc |
ISOSimple.msi malicious ROMULUS installer \ | VirusTotal 35/73 malicious (trojan.dllhijack/usblj426) |
| hash_sha256 | 91a22cf3154944897cbcaffc7d20d4596e972d280ee134197d41d8d8eefb0fe2 |
IconEdit2Turb.msi malicious ROMULUS installer \ | VirusTotal 43/73 malicious (trojan.clickfix/loader) |
| hash_sha256 | 9ac13a8ef7bab76c4d074385fd783e8c9542a8db7a166c3d3921a48add092455 |
FilesinspectorX.msi malicious ROMULUS installer \ | VirusTotal 32/74 malicious (trojan.ravartar/misc) |
| hash_sha256 | 917f2bc33faba15236be1bf6c5a121dbca3fdf38b56c03ad08e6c46b464509fe |
ClipboardFusion.msi malicious ROMULUS installer \ | VirusTotal 1/74 malicious (trojan.) |
| hash_sha256 | 3cd1484cc5bf10e22d79784beba58a75d7b126c46efb5e1a85d6aab884447621 |
I++u.dll V2 loader DLL with fake SharpCompress version info \ | VirusTotal 46/73 malicious (trojan.loader/malgent) |
| hash_sha256 | 5b71b49bad415643ff3e291ee3ba550e5edfd584eb913859dadb81634450e7e7 |
WinWrapIDE.exe signed binary abused by CNCMachineRMS \ | VirusTotal 36/75 malicious (trojan.genericfca/qwexlafiba) |
| url | http://167.76.44.160/app/5dbd80d34839/ClipboardFusion.msi |
ROMULUS C2 delivery URL for ClipboardFusion.msi payload | |
| url | http://167.148.201.224/app/5dbd80d34839/ClipboardFusion.msi |
ROMULUS C2 delivery URL for ClipboardFusion.msi payload | |
| filename | IconEdit2Turb.msi |
Malicious MSI installer distributed through ROMULUS ClickFix activity, impersonating Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool | |
| filename | AllMyBasic.msi |
Malicious MSI installer tied to ROMULUS campaign | |
| filename | ISOSimple.msi |
Malicious MSI installer in ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS chain | |
| filename | ClipboardFusion.msi |
Malicious MSI installer served from ROMULUS C2 servers 167.76.44.160 and 167.148.201.224 | |
| filename | DeElevate64.exe |
Legitimate Stardock signed binary abused for DLL sideloading | |
| filename | DeElevator64.dll |
Patched companion DLL introducing dependency on malicious I++u.dll | |
| filename | I++u.dll |
Malicious DLL placed in installation directory; decodes and runs embedded shellcode launching CNCMachineRMS | |
| filename | senddmp.resources.dll |
DLL used to allocate shellcode in ROMULUS sideloading chain | |
| filename | res.dll |
Sideloaded DLL in ROMULUS chain | |
| filename | Build.dat |
Co-located artifact in Stardock DeElevate64 sideloading chain | |
| filename | WinWrapIDE.exe |
Legitimate IBM SPSS IDE binary abused for DLL sideloading in BabaDeda chain | |
| filename | HelperStandardizationApplication.bin |
Config file carrying CNCMachineRMS payload under two obfuscation layers | |
| filename | model.dat |
Shellcode file loaded via CNCMachineRMS BabaDeda sideloading chain | |
| filename | task_payload.bin |
CNCMachineRMS task payload file staged under %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\ | |
| filename | sp.bin |
CNCMachineRMS state database at %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin | |
| registry | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run |
Persistence key used by ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS Stardock installer chain |
IOC Sweep Queries (Splunk):
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="93.152.213.151" OR id_orig_h="93.152.213.151")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p, proto
| table id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p, proto, count, first_seen, last_seen
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="93.152.213.151" OR src_ip="93.152.213.151")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action
| table src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action, count]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="96.62.224.81" OR id_orig_h="96.62.224.81")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="96.62.224.81" OR src_ip="96.62.224.81")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="86.109.75.7" OR id_orig_h="86.109.75.7")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="86.109.75.7" OR src_ip="86.109.75.7")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="151.240.151.223" OR id_orig_h="151.240.151.223")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="151.240.151.223" OR src_ip="151.240.151.223")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="23.94.145.224" OR id_orig_h="23.94.145.224")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="23.94.145.224" OR src_ip="23.94.145.224")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="93.152.224.118" OR id_orig_h="93.152.224.118")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="93.152.224.118" OR src_ip="93.152.224.118")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="2.27.248.127" OR id_orig_h="2.27.248.127")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="2.27.248.127" OR src_ip="2.27.248.127")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="167.76.44.160" OR id_orig_h="167.76.44.160")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="167.76.44.160" OR src_ip="167.76.44.160")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="167.148.201.224" OR id_orig_h="167.148.201.224")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="167.148.201.224" OR src_ip="167.148.201.224")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="86.107.124.7" OR id_orig_h="86.107.124.7")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="86.107.124.7" OR src_ip="86.107.124.7")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn (id_resp_h="23.94.252.153" OR id_orig_h="23.94.252.153")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" (dest_ip="23.94.252.153" OR src_ip="23.94.252.153")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_conn id_resp_h="85.158.110.78" id_resp_p=443
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, id_resp_p
| append [search index=firewall-pan sourcetype="pan:traffic:aggregated" dest_ip="85.158.110.78" dest_port=443
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_dns query="*cloubflare.top*"
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, query, answers
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName="*cloubflare.top*"
| stats count by Computer, QueryName, QueryResults]
| append [search index=dns query="*cloubflare.top*"
| stats count by src_ip, query, reply]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_dns query="*cloubflare.net*"
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id_orig_h, query, answers
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName="*cloubflare.net*"
| stats count by Computer, QueryName, QueryResults]
index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName="*notepadreleased.com*"
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by Computer, User, Image, QueryName, QueryResults
| append [search index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_dns query="*notepadreleased.com*"
| stats count by id_orig_h, query, answers]
| append [search index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_ssl server_name="notepadreleased.com"
| stats count by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, server_name]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_dns query="*orders-amazon.com.advancedfences.com*"
| stats count by id_orig_h, query, answers
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName="*advancedfences.com*"
| stats count by Computer, QueryName]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_dns query="*veriffication-redirect.com*"
| stats count by id_orig_h, query, answers
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName="*veriffication-redirect.com*"
| stats count by Computer, QueryName]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_dns query="*microsoftofice.cz*"
| stats count by id_orig_h, query, answers
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName="*microsoftofice.cz*"
| stats count by Computer, QueryName]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_dns query="*howclens.com*"
| stats count by id_orig_h, query, answers
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=22 QueryName="*howclens.com*"
| stats count by Computer, QueryName]
index=sysmon (Hashes="*0457414c4504b70115798eee9c8384a8bf9e793461ffb2e0661a6dcc6ed4809f*" OR SHA256="0457414c4504b70115798eee9c8384a8bf9e793461ffb2e0661a6dcc6ed4809f")
| stats count by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes
| append [search index=crowdstrike SHA256Hash="0457414c4504b70115798eee9c8384a8bf9e793461ffb2e0661a6dcc6ed4809f"
| stats count by ComputerName, FileName]
index=sysmon (Hashes="*f4d7c5321bb0d1bda439304a753bcf9b467b98ca53c7e9493b9c2c3451092e4a*" OR SHA256="f4d7c5321bb0d1bda439304a753bcf9b467b98ca53c7e9493b9c2c3451092e4a")
| stats count by Computer, Image, Hashes
index=sysmon (Hashes="*6761aad48a3f987238994d92bca97e4b8550e0150607bd67b47b1b6366a371fc*" OR SHA256="6761aad48a3f987238994d92bca97e4b8550e0150607bd67b47b1b6366a371fc")
| stats count by Computer, Image, Hashes
index=sysmon (Hashes="*91a22cf3154944897cbcaffc7d20d4596e972d280ee134197d41d8d8eefb0fe2*" OR SHA256="91a22cf3154944897cbcaffc7d20d4596e972d280ee134197d41d8d8eefb0fe2")
| stats count by Computer, Image, Hashes
index=sysmon (Hashes="*9ac13a8ef7bab76c4d074385fd783e8c9542a8db7a166c3d3921a48add092455*" OR SHA256="9ac13a8ef7bab76c4d074385fd783e8c9542a8db7a166c3d3921a48add092455")
| stats count by Computer, Image, Hashes
index=sysmon (Hashes="*917f2bc33faba15236be1bf6c5a121dbca3fdf38b56c03ad08e6c46b464509fe*" OR SHA256="917f2bc33faba15236be1bf6c5a121dbca3fdf38b56c03ad08e6c46b464509fe")
| stats count by Computer, Image, Hashes
index=sysmon (Hashes="*3cd1484cc5bf10e22d79784beba58a75d7b126c46efb5e1a85d6aab884447621*" OR SHA256="3cd1484cc5bf10e22d79784beba58a75d7b126c46efb5e1a85d6aab884447621")
| stats count by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes
index=sysmon (Hashes="*5b71b49bad415643ff3e291ee3ba550e5edfd584eb913859dadb81634450e7e7*" OR SHA256="5b71b49bad415643ff3e291ee3ba550e5edfd584eb913859dadb81634450e7e7")
| stats count by Computer, Image, Hashes
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_http (uri="*/app/5dbd80d34839/ClipboardFusion.msi*" OR host="167.76.44.160")
| stats count by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, host, uri
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=1 CommandLine="*167.76.44.160*ClipboardFusion*"
| stats count by Computer, CommandLine]
index=corelight sourcetype=corelight_http (uri="*/app/5dbd80d34839/ClipboardFusion.msi*" OR host="167.148.201.224")
| stats count by id_orig_h, id_resp_h, host, uri
| append [search index=sysmon EventCode=1 CommandLine="*167.148.201.224*ClipboardFusion*"
| stats count by Computer, CommandLine]
index=sysmon (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*IconEdit2Turb*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*IconEdit2Turb*")
| stats count by Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename
index=sysmon (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*AllMyBasic*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*AllMyBasic*")
| stats count by Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename
index=sysmon (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*ISOSimple*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*ISOSimple*")
| stats count by Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename
index=sysmon (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*ClipboardFusion.msi*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*ClipboardFusion.msi*")
| stats count by Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\DeElevate64.exe" NOT Image="*\\Stardock\\*"
| stats count by Computer, User, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine
index=sysmon EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\DeElevator64.dll"
| stats count by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed
index=sysmon (EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*I++u.dll*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*I++u.dll*")
| stats count by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, TargetFilename, Hashes
index=sysmon (EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*senddmp.resources.dll*") OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*senddmp.resources.dll*")
| stats count by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, TargetFilename, Hashes
index=sysmon EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\res.dll" Image="*\\DeElevate64.exe"
| stats count by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes
index=sysmon EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\Build.dat"
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetFilename
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\WinWrapIDE.exe" NOT Image="*\\IBM\\*" NOT Image="*\\SPSS\\*"
| stats count by Computer, User, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine
index=sysmon EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*HelperStandardizationApplication.bin*"
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetFilename
index=sysmon EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\model.dat"
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetFilename
index=sysmon EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*CNCMachineRMS*task_payload.bin*"
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetFilename
index=sysmon EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\SProject\\sp.bin*"
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetFilename
index=sysmon (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13) TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run*" (Details="*DeElevate*" OR Details="*WinWrapIDE*" OR Details="*I++u*" OR Details="*Stardock*")
| stats count by Computer, User, EventCode, TargetObject, Details, Image
YARA Rules
ROMULUS_CNCMachineRMS_Filesystem_Artifacts: Detects CNCMachineRMS filesystem artifacts including task payload paths, state database paths, and configuration filenames referenced in ROMULUS and BabaDeda infection chains.
rule ROMULUS_CNCMachineRMS_Filesystem_Artifacts {
meta:
author = "RedSheepSec"
description = "Detects CNCMachineRMS filesystem artifacts from ROMULUS and BabaDeda infection chains"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/"
reference2 = "https://cyfar.ca/posts/cncmachinerms-the-undocumented-rat-at-the-end-of-a-babadeda-chain"
strings:
$path1 = "CNCMachineRMS\\tasks" ascii wide nocase
$path2 = "task_payload.bin" ascii wide nocase
$path3 = "SProject\\sp.bin" ascii wide nocase
$path4 = "HelperStandardizationApplication.bin" ascii wide nocase
$dll1 = "I++u.dll" ascii wide
$dll2 = "senddmp.resources.dll" ascii wide
$file1 = "Build.dat" ascii wide
$file2 = "model.dat" ascii wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and (any of ($path*)) or (3 of ($dll*, $file*))
}
ROMULUS_Malicious_MSI_Indicators: Detects malicious MSI installer filenames and sideloading artifacts associated with the ROMULUS ClickFix delivery platform, including trojanized Stardock and ClipboardFusion installers.
rule ROMULUS_Malicious_MSI_Indicators {
meta:
author = "RedSheepSec"
description = "Detects ROMULUS malicious MSI installer references and DLL sideloading artifacts"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/"
strings:
$msi1 = "IconEdit2Turb.msi" ascii wide nocase
$msi2 = "AllMyBasic.msi" ascii wide nocase
$msi3 = "ISOSimple.msi" ascii wide nocase
$msi4 = "ClipboardFusion.msi" ascii wide nocase
$bin1 = "DeElevate64.exe" ascii wide
$bin2 = "DeElevator64.dll" ascii wide
$c2_1 = "cloubflare.top" ascii wide
$c2_2 = "cloubflare.net" ascii wide
$c2_3 = "notepadreleased.com" ascii wide
condition:
(any of ($msi*) and any of ($bin*)) or (2 of ($c2_*))
}
ROMULUS_CNCMachineRMS_SHA256_IOCs: Detects known SHA256 hashes of ROMULUS malicious MSI installers and sideloaded DLLs by matching hex byte patterns from the hash values.
rule ROMULUS_CNCMachineRMS_SHA256_IOCs {
meta:
author = "RedSheepSec"
description = "Matches known ROMULUS/CNCMachineRMS file hashes embedded in binary content"
date = "2026-11-20"
reference = "https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/"
strings:
$hash_deelevator = { 04 57 41 4c 45 04 b7 01 15 79 8e ee 9c 83 84 a8 bf 9e 79 34 61 ff b2 e0 66 1a 6d cc 6e d4 80 9f }
$hash_iplusplus = { 3c d1 48 4c c5 bf 10 e2 2d 79 78 4b eb a5 8a 75 d7 b1 26 c4 6e fb 5e 1a 85 d6 aa b8 84 44 76 21 }
$str_cnc = "CNCMachineRMS" ascii wide
condition:
any of ($hash_*) or $str_cnc
}
Suricata Rules
SID 2026001: Detects DNS query for ROMULUS C2 domain cloubflare.top
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"ROMULUS C2 DNS Query - cloubflare.top"; dns.query; content:"cloubflare"; content:"top"; sid:2026001; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/;)
SID 2026002: Detects DNS query for ROMULUS C2 domain cloubflare.net
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"ROMULUS C2 DNS Query - cloubflare.net"; dns.query; content:"cloubflare"; content:"net"; sid:2026002; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/;)
SID 2026003: Detects DNS query for CNCMachineRMS C2 domain notepadreleased.com
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"CNCMachineRMS C2 DNS Query - notepadreleased.com"; dns.query; content:"notepadreleased"; content:"com"; sid:2026003; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,cyfar.ca/posts/cncmachinerms-the-undocumented-rat-at-the-end-of-a-babadeda-chain;)
SID 2026004: Detects outbound TLS connection to CNCMachineRMS C2 IP 85.158.110.78 on port 443
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> 85.158.110.78 443 (msg:"CNCMachineRMS C2 TLS Connection to 85.158.110.78"; sid:2026004; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,cyfar.ca/posts/cncmachinerms-the-undocumented-rat-at-the-end-of-a-babadeda-chain;)
SID 2026005: Detects outbound connection to ROMULUS C2 server 93.152.213.151
alert ip $HOME_NET any -> 93.152.213.151 any (msg:"ROMULUS C2 Connection to 93.152.213.151"; sid:2026005; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/;)
SID 2026006: Detects HTTP request for ClipboardFusion.msi payload delivery path used by ROMULUS
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"ROMULUS ClipboardFusion.msi Payload Download"; http.uri; content:"/app/5dbd80d34839/ClipboardFusion.msi"; sid:2026006; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/;)
SID 2026007: Detects DNS query for ClickFix phishing domain microsoftofice.cz
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"ClickFix Phishing DNS Query - microsoftofice.cz"; dns.query; content:"microsoftofice"; content:"cz"; sid:2026007; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:social-engineering; reference:url,thehackernews.com/2026/11/romulus-clickfix-attacks-deliver-rat.html;)
SID 2026008: Detects outbound connection to ROMULUS infrastructure IP 167.76.44.160
alert ip $HOME_NET any -> 167.76.44.160 any (msg:"ROMULUS C2 Connection to 167.76.44.160"; sid:2026008; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/;)
SID 2026009: Detects outbound connection to ROMULUS infrastructure IP 167.148.201.224
alert ip $HOME_NET any -> 167.148.201.224 any (msg:"ROMULUS C2 Connection to 167.148.201.224"; sid:2026009; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_11_20; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,blackpointcyber.com/blog/romulus-cncmachinerms/;)
Data Source Requirements
| Source | Required For | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon EventID 1 (Process Creation) | T1204.004, T1053.005, T1574.002, T1106 | Required for process tree analysis of ClickFix chains (explorer.exe -> powershell.exe -> msiexec.exe), sideloading binary execution, and scheduled task creation. Must include CommandLine and ParentImage fields. Available via index=sysmon. |
| Sysmon EventID 7 (Image Loaded / DLL Load) | T1574.002, T1106 | Critical for detecting DLL sideloading. Must capture Image (host process), ImageLoaded (DLL path), Hashes, and Signed fields. Available via index=sysmon. Configuration must include DLL load events, which are not enabled by default in many Sysmon configurations. |
| Sysmon EventID 11 (File Create) | T1574.002, T1547.001 | Required for detecting CNCMachineRMS filesystem artifacts: task_payload.bin, sp.bin, Build.dat, HelperStandardizationApplication.bin, model.dat. Available via index=sysmon. |
| Sysmon EventID 13 (Registry Value Set) | T1547.001 | Detects Run key persistence modifications. Available via index=sysmon. |
| Sysmon EventID 22 (DNS Query) | T1071.001 | Required for detecting DNS-over-HTTPS C2 resolution by CNCMachineRMS. Standard DNS server logs will not capture DoH queries. Available via index=sysmon. Verify this event type is enabled in Sysmon configuration. |
| PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (EventID 4104) | T1204.004 | Captures full PowerShell script content from ClickFix clipboard-paste execution. Available via index=powershell. |
| Windows Security EventID 4720 | T1136.001 | Detects local account creation by CNCMachineRMS backdoor capability. Available via index=winevent. |
| Windows Security EventID 4698 | T1053.005 | Captures scheduled task creation events. Available via index=winevent. |
| Zeek/Corelight Network Logs | T1071.001 | conn, dns, http, and ssl logs for detecting C2 connections to ROMULUS infrastructure IPs and domains. Available via index=corelight. |
| Palo Alto Firewall Logs | T1071.001 | Traffic logs for perimeter detection of connections to ROMULUS C2 IPs. Available via index=firewall-pan sourcetype=pan:traffic:aggregated. |
| CrowdStrike EDR | T1574.002, T1204.004, T1136.001 | Provides process tree, DLL load, and file hash telemetry complementing Sysmon. Available via index=crowdstrike. |
Recommendations
- Add all 12 ROMULUS infrastructure IPs (93.152.213.151, 96.62.224.81, 86.109.75.7, 151.240.151.223, 23.94.145.224, 93.152.224.118, 2.27.248.127, 167.76.44.160, 167.148.201.224, 86.107.124.7, 23.94.252.153, 85.158.110.78) and 7 domains (cloubflare.top, cloubflare.net, notepadreleased.com, orders-amazon.com.advancedfences.com, veriffication-redirect.com, login.microsoftofice.cz, updates.howclens.com) to network blocklists and SIEM watchlists.
- Deploy the three Sigma rules (ClickFix MSIExec pattern, Stardock DeElevate64 sideloading, CNCMachineRMS C2 DNS resolution) across all Splunk and Elastic SIEM instances after validation and tuning to exclude known legitimate software deployment workflows.
- Verify that Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL load) and Event ID 22 (DNS query) are enabled in the active Sysmon configuration across all Windows endpoints. CNCMachineRMS uses DNS-over-HTTPS, making Event ID 22 the only endpoint-based detection point for C2 domain resolution.
- Audit all Siemens Software Center installations for version 4.0.9.8 or later to remediate CVE-2026-110936 (CVSS v4 8.4). Scan Siemens Software Center installation directories for unsigned DLLs.
- Hunt for CNCMachineRMS filesystem artifacts across all Windows endpoints: %TEMP%\CNCMachineRMS\tasks\*\task_payload.bin, %LOCALAPPDATA%\SProject\sp.bin, HelperStandardizationApplication.bin in user-writable directories, and Build.dat co-located with DeElevate64.exe outside standard Stardock installation paths.
- Deploy the nine Suricata rules for ROMULUS C2 infrastructure detection at network perimeter IDS/IPS sensors.
- Evaluate whether endpoint TLS inspection or proxy-based SSL decryption can detect DNS-over-HTTPS queries to public resolvers, as CNCMachineRMS uses DoH to bypass internal DNS monitoring entirely.
- Sweep for all 11 SHA256 hashes across Sysmon and CrowdStrike EDR data to identify any historical presence of ROMULUS MSI installers or sideloaded DLLs.
- Brief end users on ClickFix social engineering: fake CAPTCHA or browser-error pages instructing users to open the Run dialog and paste clipboard content. Consider restricting Win+R access or PowerShell execution policy on user workstations where administrative use is not required.
Sources
- Blackpoint Cyber - ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS
- The Hacker News - ROMULUS ClickFix Attacks Deliver RAT
- News LAVX - Hackers Use ROMULUS ClickFix Platform to Deliver LegionLoader Malware
- SecurityWeek - Siemens Software Center Vulnerability Exploited in ClickFix Malware Attacks
- HijackLibs Pull Request 199 - DeElevate64.exe / deelevator64.dll Sideloading Entry
- LevelBlue SpiderLabs - CNCMachineRMS: The Undocumented RAT at the End of a BabaDeda Chain
- Cyfar - CNCMachineRMS: The Undocumented RAT at the End of a BabaDeda Chain
- The Hacker News - 17000 URLs Reveal How ClickFix Turns Users Into Attackers
- The Hacker News - Researcher Analyzes 3000 Live ClickFix Payloads
- The Hacker News - ROMULUS ClickFix Platform Tricks Users