Executive Summary
April 2026 is defined by the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury against Iranian military targets and a fragile ceasefire whose durability remains uncertain[1]. Iranian-linked cyberattacks have surged eight-fold across the Middle East, with the UAE alone reporting 800,000 daily attacks [5], while the character of these operations has shifted from disruptive wiper-style attacks toward more complex, sustained intrusion campaigns targeting Gulf critical infrastructure [4]. Defenders across the CENTCOM theater should treat this as a wartime cyber environment with no clear off-ramp.
What Changed Since March 2026
- U.S. Central Command | Operation Epic Fury
- Peace Through Strength: Operation Epic Fury Crushes Iranian Threat as Ceasefire Takes Hold – The White House
- Operation Epic Fury Update – April 24, 2026
- Iranian cyber attacks move from disruptive to complex threats in Gulf
- UAE targeted by 350 groups and 320 hackers as daily cyberattacks quadruple amid rising ai-driven threats
- Iranian-linked cyberattacks have surged 8x across the Middle East
- U.S. uses Ukrainian anti-drone technology to protect Saudi base from Iran attacks
- Zelensky Announces 'Drone Agreement' with Gulf States to Counter Iranian UAVs
- Pakistan sends fighter jets to Saudi Arabia amid fragile US-Iran ceasefire
- Leaked Documents Reveal Details of the Secret Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Mutual Defense Pact
- Three Scenarios for the Gulf States After the Iran War
Military and Diplomatic
- Operation Epic Fury and ceasefire status. CENTCOM's Operation Epic Fury targeted Iranian military capabilities directly, and the White House has characterized the operation as having "crushed" the Iranian threat[1]. A ceasefire is now in effect but is described as fragile by multiple sources [1][8]. Updates to the operation continued through at least April 24, indicating that CENTCOM has not stood down its posture [2].
- Pakistan military deployment to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan sent fighter jets to Saudi Arabia during the ceasefire period [8]. Leaked documents reportedly reveal the existence of a secret Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense pact [9]. This is the first confirmed activation of such an arrangement in the context of the Iran conflict and introduces a new military actor into the Gulf defense equation.
- Ukraine-Gulf drone defense cooperation. Ukrainian anti-drone technology is being used by the U.S. to protect Saudi bases from Iranian drone attacks [6]. President Zelensky announced a separate drone agreement with Gulf states aimed at countering Iranian UAVs [7]. This represents a new defense technology transfer axis running from the Ukraine conflict theater into CENTCOM.
- Post-conflict scenario planning. Carnegie Endowment analysis outlines three scenarios for Gulf states after the Iran war, suggesting significant uncertainty about the regional order going forward [10]. The analytical community is treating the ceasefire as a pause, not a resolution.
Cyber Operations
- Eight-fold surge in Iranian-linked attacks. Reporting indicates Iranian-linked cyberattacks across the Middle East have increased by a factor of eight. This surge almost certainly correlates with the kinetic phase of Operation Epic Fury and Iran's strategic need to impose costs below the threshold of renewed military escalation.
- Shift from disruptive to complex operations. Iranian cyber operations in the Gulf have moved beyond simple disruption (wipers, DDoS) toward more sophisticated, persistent campaigns [4]. This shift is consistent with an adversary investing in long-term access to critical infrastructure rather than one-off destructive attacks.
- UAE under massive daily attack volume. The UAE faces approximately 800,000 cyberattacks per day, with reporting attributing activity to roughly 350 groups and 320 individual threat actors [5]. AI-driven attack techniques are reportedly contributing to the volume increase [5]. Even accounting for inflated reporting metrics, the scale indicates a sustained campaign against UAE government, financial, and infrastructure networks.
- Leaked Saudi-Pakistan defense pact documents. The leak of classified mutual defense pact details [9] is itself a cyber-relevant event. Whether the leak originated from a cyber intrusion, an insider, or a deliberate disclosure, it exposes sensitive bilateral defense planning to adversary intelligence services and creates counterintelligence concerns for both nations.
- Iran domestic internet blackout. Iran's nationwide internet blackout has exceeded 1,000 hours according to component country briefing context. This complicates Western collection against Iranian cyber actors and may be enabling Iran to conduct offensive operations with reduced visibility into its own network activity.
Economic and Supply Chain
- Gulf digitization under fire. Saudi Vision 2030 digitization efforts, UAE smart city infrastructure, and Qatar energy sector modernization all represent expanding attack surfaces under active exploitation [4][5]. The baseline assessment's warning about wiper malware precedents (Shamoon, ZeroCleare) remains valid, but the threat has broadened to include sustained espionage and complex intrusions against these same systems.
- Energy infrastructure targeting. Oil and gas SCADA systems, desalination plants, and LNG terminals remain primary target sets for Iranian cyber capability. The eight-fold surge in attacks almost certainly includes operations against energy sector OT networks, consistent with Iran's historical pattern of using cyber operations for coercive signaling during periods of strategic pressure.
- Defense technology supply chains. The introduction of Ukrainian anti-drone systems into the Gulf theater [6][7] creates new supply chain dependencies. These systems carry their own software, firmware, and communications stacks that will require vetting and integration into existing force protection architectures.
Ukraine-Gulf States Counter-Drone Coordination
- Evidence of collaboration: The U.S. is deploying Ukrainian anti-drone technology to protect Saudi bases [6]. Zelensky separately announced a drone agreement with Gulf states specifically to counter Iranian UAVs [7].
- Domains: Military, technology, defense industrial base.
- Implications for CENTCOM: This coordination introduces Ukrainian electronic warfare and counter-UAS technology into the CENTCOM theater. These systems involve cyber-physical components (RF jamming, GPS spoofing countermeasures, sensor fusion software) that create new integration challenges and potential attack vectors. Adversaries, particularly Iranian actors, will likely seek to understand and exploit these systems. CENTCOM networks supporting counter-drone operations become higher-priority targets.
- Confidence: Moderate. Both sources are Tier 4, but the convergence of two independent reports and the logical consistency with known Ukrainian drone warfare expertise support the assessment.
- Sources: [6], [7]
Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Mutual Defense Activation
- Evidence of collaboration: Pakistan deployed fighter jets to Saudi Arabia during the ceasefire [8]. Leaked documents reveal a secret mutual defense pact between the two countries [9].
- Domains: Military, intelligence, diplomatic.
- Implications for CENTCOM: Pakistani military assets operating from Saudi bases will use command and control systems that must integrate (or at minimum coexist) with Saudi and U.S. networks. The leaked pact documents [9] mean adversary intelligence services now have detailed knowledge of the arrangement's terms, likely informing Iranian targeting of Pakistani military communications and Saudi-Pakistani liaison channels. CENTCOM's information sharing calculus becomes more complex with a new bilateral military relationship in its AOR.
- Confidence: Moderate for the deployment (Tier 3 Al Jazeera source). Moderate for the defense pact details (Tier 4 source, leaked documents not independently verified).
- Sources: [8], [9]
Iran Proxy Network Cyber-Kinetic Integration
- Evidence of collaboration: The eight-fold surge in Iranian-linked cyberattacks coincides with Operation Epic Fury targeting Iranian military capabilities[1]. The shift from disruptive to complex cyber operations [4] occurred during active hostilities and the subsequent ceasefire.
- Domains: Cyber, military, intelligence.
- Implications for CENTCOM: Iran's proxy network (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias) has historically provided deniable vectors for cyber operations. The current surge likely includes proxy-affiliated actors conducting operations on behalf of or in coordination with Iranian state cyber units. During the ceasefire, cyber operations provide Iran a mechanism to continue imposing costs without triggering renewed kinetic escalation. This is the most dangerous period for Gulf critical infrastructure.
- Confidence: Moderate for the surge correlation. Moderate for proxy-specific attribution (no source material directly attributes the surge to specific proxy groups).
- Sources: [4],,, [1]
Operational Implications
- Wartime cyber posture is the correct default. The ceasefire has not reduced Iranian cyber operation tempo. The eight-fold attack surge and the shift toward complex intrusion campaigns [4] indicate that Iran is treating cyberspace as its primary domain for continued coercion. CENTCOM networks, partner nation infrastructure, and forward-deployed force support systems should all be treated as actively targeted.
Sources: [4],
- OT and ICS networks in the energy and water sectors are at highest risk. Iran's historical targeting of SCADA systems and the current escalation pattern make Gulf energy infrastructure (oil/gas, LNG, desalination) the most likely target set for a high-impact destructive cyber operation, particularly if the ceasefire collapses.
Sources: [4],
- Counter-drone system integration creates new attack surface. The rapid deployment of Ukrainian anti-drone technology into Saudi and Gulf bases [6][7] introduces systems that haven't been tested in this threat environment. Firmware integrity, communications encryption, and sensor data authentication for these platforms should be validated before operational reliance.
Sources: [6], [7]
- Intelligence gap: Iranian cyber C2 during internet blackout. Iran's extended domestic internet blackout degrades Western visibility into Iranian cyber command and control infrastructure. Collection requirements should prioritize identifying alternate C2 channels (satellite links, VPN exit nodes in third countries, proxy-hosted infrastructure) that Iranian operators are using during the blackout.
Sources: Component briefing context
- Counterintelligence concern: leaked defense pact. The Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense pact leak [9] suggests either a cyber compromise or an insider threat affecting one of the signatories. Any CENTCOM intelligence shared with either partner under existing arrangements should be reviewed for potential exposure.
Sources: [9]
Outlook
The next 30 days will be defined by whether the ceasefire holds or collapses. If it collapses, we assess with high confidence that Iranian cyber operations will escalate further, likely including destructive attacks against Gulf energy or water infrastructure consistent with historical precedent [4][10]. Carnegie's scenario analysis [10] suggests Gulf states are already planning for a post-conflict security architecture that may permanently alter alliance structures in the CENTCOM AOR. Watch for: ceasefire expiration or extension announcements, any Iranian retaliatory cyber operation attributed publicly by a Gulf state, and further Ukrainian defense technology integration deals that expand the counter-drone cooperation into broader cyber defense partnerships [6][7].
Sources: [4],, [6], [7], [10]
🐑
Red Sheep Assessment
Assessment (Moderate Confidence): The sources collectively point to something that isn't being stated outright: Iran has likely made a strategic decision to shift its primary coercive toolkit from kinetic proxy operations to cyber operations during the ceasefire period. The eight-fold surge, the qualitative shift toward complex intrusions [4], and the sustained volume against the UAE [5] aren't just retaliatory spillover from the kinetic conflict. They represent a deliberate campaign designed to demonstrate that a ceasefire doesn't equal safety for Gulf states. Iran can't currently match U.S. military power after Operation Epic Fury, so cyberspace becomes its preferred domain for continued escalation without triggering a renewed kinetic response.
The contrarian read: the ceasefire might actually be more dangerous for Gulf cyber defenders than the kinetic phase was. During active hostilities, Iranian cyber resources were likely split between offensive operations and defensive priorities (protecting their own military C2, coping with the internet blackout). With kinetic operations paused, those resources can be concentrated entirely on offensive cyber campaigns. Defenders who assume the ceasefire reduces risk are almost certainly wrong.
Additionally, the speed of the Ukraine-Gulf drone defense partnership [6][7] suggests a technology transfer pipeline that's moving faster than the security vetting process can keep up with. If Iranian actors are already studying Ukrainian counter-drone systems from the Ukraine conflict (which is very likely), they may have a head start on identifying vulnerabilities in systems now being deployed to protect CENTCOM-area bases.
🛡️
Defender's Checklist
- ▢[ ] Hunt for PLC exploitation across water and energy OT networks. Iranian actors are actively targeting programmable logic controllers per component briefing context. Prioritize reviewing Modbus/TCP and EtherNet/IP traffic logs for anomalous write commands, especially in water treatment and power generation environments. Cross-reference with CISA's Iran-related ICS advisories.
- ▢[ ] Validate firmware integrity on newly deployed counter-UAS systems. If your organization supports bases receiving Ukrainian anti-drone technology [6][7], verify firmware hashes against known-good baselines. Audit RF communication channels for unexpected beacon traffic. These systems are new to the theater and haven't been hardened against Iranian EW/cyber capabilities specific to the Gulf.
- ▢[ ] Block known Iranian proxy infrastructure and update threat feeds. The eight-fold surge means your existing block lists are likely incomplete. Pull the latest Iranian-attributed IOCs from CISA, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, and Mandiant. Prioritize DNS-based indicators: Iranian operators historically rely on dynamic DNS for C2 during high-tempo operations.
- ▢[ ] Review information sharing boundaries with Saudi and Pakistani partners. The leaked defense pact [9] means sensitive information may have been compromised. Audit what has been shared through bilateral channels in the past 90 days and assess exposure risk. Restrict access to classified systems that interface with partner networks until the leak source is determined.
- ▢[ ] Increase monitoring for AI-augmented phishing and credential harvesting. UAE reporting flags AI-driven threats as a contributing factor in the attack volume surge [5]. SOC teams should tune email security gateways for LLM-generated phishing indicators (unusual linguistic consistency, lack of typical ESL artifacts in Persian-origin campaigns) and increase scrutiny of OAuth token requests from unfamiliar applications.
Sources
- [1] "Peace Through Strength: Operation Epic Fury Crushes Iranian Threat as Ceasefire Takes Hold" - The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/peace-through-strength-operation-epic-fury-crushes-iranian-threat-as-ceasefire-takes-hold/
- [2] "Operation Epic Fury Update, April 24, 2026" - SOF News, https://sof.news/middle-east/epic-fury-24april2026/
- [3] "2026 Iran war" - Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iran_war
- [4] "Iranian cyber attacks move from disruptive to complex threats in Gulf" - The National News, https://www.thenationalnews.com/future/technology/2026/04/10/iranian-cyber-attacks-move-from-disruptive-to-complex-threats-in-gulf/
- [5] "UAE targeted by 350 groups and 320 hackers as daily cyberattacks quadruple amid rising AI-driven threats" - Gulf News, https://gulfnews.com/amp/story/uae/crime/uae-faces-800000cyberattacks-daily-despite-lull-1.500513370
- [6] "U.S. uses Ukrainian anti-drone technology to protect Saudi base from Iran attacks" - NV (Ukrainska Pravda English), https://english.nv.ua/nation/u-s-uses-ukrainian-anti-drone-technology-to-protect-saudi-base-from-iran-attacks-50602293.html
- [7] "Zelensky Announces 'Drone Agreement' with Gulf States to Counter Iranian UAVs" - Voice of Emirates, https://www.voiceofemirates.com/en/news/2026/04/24/zelensky-announces-drone-agreement-with-gulf-states-to-counter-iranian-uavs/
- [8] "Pakistan sends fighter jets to Saudi Arabia amid fragile US-Iran ceasefire" - Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/11/pakistan-sends-fighter-jets-to-saudi-arabia-amid-fragile-us-iran-ceasefire
- [9] "Leaked Documents Reveal Details of the Secret Saudi Arabia, Pakistan Mutual Defense Pact" - Drop Site News, https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/leaked-saudi-arabia-pakistan-mutual-defense-pact-iran
- [10] "Three Scenarios for the Gulf States After the Iran War" - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/04/gulf-states-gcc-iran-war-three-scenarios